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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JACKIE SUE GAMBILL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060466-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT & NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On September 30, 2002, defendant was placed on probation after having pleaded 
guilty to two third degree felonies. On January 9, 2006, the district court issued an order 
extending her probation pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12) (West 2004). 
Defendant now appeals from the decision to extend her probation. This Court has 
jurisdiction over appeals involving third degree felonies pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the district court abuse its discretion by extending defendant's 
probation, where defendant admittedly failed to pay the restitution amount that she was 
originally ordered to pay as a condition of her probation? 
Standard of Review: "The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in 
the discretion of the trial court. Therefore, in order to succeed in this claim, defendant 
must show that the evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in 
revoking defendant's probation." State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Issue 2: Did the district court commit plain error by failing to invoke the statute 
of limitations on defendant's behalf, where defendant had already pleaded guilty to the 
underlying charges? 
Standard of Review: To establish plain error, the defendant must show that "(i) 
an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) that the 
error is harmful." State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, fl2, 126 P.3d 775, cert denied, 
133 P.3d 437 (Utah 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) (West 2004) provides that "[u]pon a 
finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the 
probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term commence 
anew." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 2, 2002, defendant was charged with: (1) one count of securities 
fraud, a second degree felony; (2) one count of selling a security as an unlicensed broker-
dealer, a third degree felony; and (3) one count of selling an unlicensed security, a third 
degree felony. R. 1-2. On August 19, 2002, defendant pleaded guilty to selling a 
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security as an unlicensed broker-dealer and to selling an unlicensed security. R. 38-39. 
The charge of securities fraud was dropped. R. 176: 1. 
On September 30, 2002, Defendant was sentenced to serve two 0-5 year prison 
terms. R. 41. Defendant's prison sentences were suspended, however, and she was 
instead placed on 36 months of probation. R. 41. Defendant was ordered to pay the 
victim $300,000 in restitution as one of the conditions of her probation. R. 41-42. 
AP&P filed a probation progress report on April 19, 2005, alleging that defendant 
still owed approximately $265,000 in restitution. R. 65. On January 9, 2006, the district 
court issued a ruling extending defendant's probation due to a failure to fully pay 
restitution. R. 137-40. Defendant appeals from the decision to extend her probation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Crime and Punishment 
On January 2, 2002, defendant Jackie Sue Gambill was charged with three felonies 
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. R. 1-3. Defendant was charged with contacting 
then 71 year-old Edison Harris and promising him that if he gave her $300,000, he would 
receive a $90,000 profit within ten days. R. 2, 176: 147. Defendant was not a licensed 
securities broker, and Mr. Harris did not receive either the promised profit or all of his 
money back. R. 2-3, 33, 176: 3. Defendant later worked out a voluntary plea bargain 
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with the State in which she pleaded guilty to two third degree felony charges in exchange 
for the dismissal of the second degree felony charge. R. 38, 176: l.1 
The district court held a sentencing hearing on September 30, 2002. Defendant 
was personally present at that hearing and was represented by counsel. R. 176: 6. The 
district court sentenced defendant to two 0-5 year prison terms, but then suspended those 
sentences and placed defendant on probation. R. 41-42. One of the conditions of 
probation was that defendant pay $300,000 in restitution to the victim. R. 176: 7 
(sentencing hearing transcript); R. 41-42 (written sentencing order); R. 44 (court's 
original minute entry). As for the rate of payment, the district court twice stated from the 
bench that defendant would be required to pay the $300,000 restitution "within one year." 
R. 176: 7, 8. The court also stated, however, that the defendant could pay that amount at 
"a rate determined by Adult Probation and Parole." R.176: 8. While the written 
sentencing order reflected both the overall $300,000 restitution amount and the ability of 
AP&P to set the "rate" of payment, the written order did not contain any reference to the 
one year repayment requirement. R. 41-42. 
1
 The record indicates that defendant repaid approximately $25,000 to the victim 
before the criminal charges were filed. R. 176: 149. That payment was independent of 
the subsequent restitution order, however, and is therefore not at issue in this appeal. 
2
 Defendant has accepted the accuracy of that transcript for purposes of this 
appeal. Aplt. Br. 16. 
3
 The district court appears to have placed an amended minute entry for the 
September 30, 2002, sentencing hearing in its file at a later date. R. 123-26. Based on its 
placement within the court's file, it appears that this document was inserted in the file 
sometime in October 2005. Defendant filed a motion contemporaneous with her opening 
appellate brief asking this Court to strike that document from the record. As set forth in 
the State's response to that motion, that amended minute entry was not signed and was 
4 
Defendant's failure to pay the entire restitution award leads to 
an extension of her probation 
Defendant's 36-month probation term was originally set to expire on September 
28, 2005. R. 65. On April 19, 2005, AP&P filed a progress report with the district court 
regarding defendant's compliance with the terms of her probation. R. 64. In that 
progress report, AP&P noted that though defendant had been paying $500 per month 
restitution, "[t]he restitution of $300,000 remains an issue as she still owes nearly 
$265,000.00." R. 65. 
The matter came before the district court on June 6, 2005, for a probation review 
hearing. The State expressed concern that "there is still an amount of restitution owing, a 
substantial amount of restitution owing." R. 176: 10. The State also noted an apparent 
conflict between the original sentence as orally issued from the bench and the subsequent 
written order regarding whether the restitution also needed to have been paid within one 
year. R. 176: 11. Regardless of whether the one year repayment requirement was 
binding or not, however, the State still stressed that defendant had not paid the entire 
$300,000 restitution amount and asked for an extension of probation on that basis. R. 
176: 11-12. Rather than ruling at that point, the district court continued the hearing so 
that it could listen to the tapes from the original sentencing hearing to determine whether 
a one year repayment requirement had originally been imposed. R. 176: 13. 
The parties next appeared before the district court on July 5, 2005. At that 
hearing, the court stated that it had listened to the tapes of the prior hearings, R. 176: 15, 
not subsequently relied upon by the court in its decision to extend probation. The State 
places no weight on that document. 
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and confimied that the original sentence as announced from the bench had included a one 
year repayment requirement. R. 176: 16. Given that AP&P's prior progress report had 
not reflected the one year requirement, the court directed AP&P to file a new progress 
report regarding defendant's compliance with all applicable probation terms. R. 176: 19. 
AP&P accordingly filed a revised progress report on July 12, 2005. R. 82. In that 
revised report, AP&P again reported that defendant had failed to pay the required 
restitution amount, and recommended that "the subject appear before the court for an 
OTC hearing and if found in violation that probation be revoked and the subject be 
ordered to serve the original sentence." R. 83. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on August 9, 2005. At that hearing, the district 
court acknowledged the "confusion" regarding the rate of payment, but noted that "at a 
minimum though there's an agreement that restitution of $300,000 was ordered." R. 176: 
28. The August 9, 2005, evidentiary hearing was ultimately continued and concluded in 
separate hearings held on September 13, 2005, and November 22, 2005. 
At the November 22, 2005 hearing, the court heard testimony from Hank Haurand, 
an AP&P officer who had supervised defendant's probation. R. 176: 70-96. Officer 
Haurand testified that the "issue that concerned AP&P" was defendant's failure to "pay 
the entire amount" of restitution. R. 176: 77. Officer Haurand testified that as of 
November 2005, defendant still owed $287,967.22. R. 176: 76.4 Although defendant 
disputed AP&P's calculations as to the total amount still owed, her counsel openly 
4
 The large amount still owing is explainable, in part, because defendant was also 
ordered to pay interest on the overall restitution amount. R. 44. Defendant has never 
challenged that requirement. 
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admitted that defendant had not paid the full amount of restitution. R. 176: 108-09 
("Nobody has said my client has paid $30050005 not even attempted to."). 
On January 9, 2006, the district court extended defendant's probation. R. 137-40. 
The court noted that defendant's original term of probation had been conditioned upon 
her paying restitution "in the amount of $300,000," and that "[n]either the defendant nor 
her counsel objected to that condition of probation as ordered by the Court in open court 
on that date." R. 139. The court also found that defendant had not "paid the full amount 
of the restitution." R. 138. 
While acknowledging that "there has been some confusion as to the rate at which 
the restitution was to be paid," the court nevertheless determined that "there has never 
been any confusion in the sentence imposed by the Court nor in the documents of Adult 
Probation and Parole, that the restitution amount was $300,000." R. 139. Although the 
court declined to "revok[e]" defendant's probation at that time, it determined that "the 
extensive amount of restitution yet to be paid" warranted an extension of probation for 
"the purposes of collecting restitution." R. 139-40. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by extending her 
probation. According to defendant, the district court improperly penalized her for having 
failed to pay restitution within one year. Contrary to defendant's assertions, the district 
court's decision was not based on her failure to pay restitution within one year, but was 
instead based on her failure to pay the full amount at all. Because defendant has not 
properly challenged either the original restitution order or the district court's subsequent 
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finding that she has not paid the full amount, defendant's first argument should be 
rejected. 
Defendant next argues that the underlying charges against her were barred by the 
statute of limitations. This Court has previously held, however, that a defendant waives 
any potential statute of limitations defenses by voluntarily pleading guilty. Because 
defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty to the two charges that formed the basis for the 
sentence at issue, her statute of limitations argument should be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXTENDING DEFENDANT'S PROBATION WHERE DEFENDANT HAS 
ADMITTED THAT SHE HAS FAILED TO PAY THE FULL 
RESTITUTION AMOUNT ORDERED IN HER ORIGINAL SENTENCE. 
Under Utah law, a defendant's probation can be extended upon a finding that "the 
defendant violated the conditions of probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) 
(West 2004). Given the plain language of this statute, Utah's courts have upheld 
probation extensions where the evidence showed that even a single probation violation 
had occurred. 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 
1990), a case relied on by defendant, is instructive. Aplt. Br. 15-16. In Jameson, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. 800 P.2d at 
800. The sentencing court stayed defendant's prison sentence and placed him on 
probation. Id One of the conditions of probation was that the defendant "[e]nter into, 
and successfully complete Fremont Incest offender program." Id The defendant failed 
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to complete the therapy program, however, and his probation was revoked. Id. at 800-01. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the revocation. The court held that because 
"[t]he decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in the discretion of the trial 
court," an appellant must show that "the evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused 
its discretion in revoking defendant's probation." Id at 804 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Because Jameson had not contested the "fact that he failed to 
complete" the required therapy program, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's 
revocation decision. IcL 
As in Jameson, the question here is whether "the evidence of a probation 
violation" was so deficient that the district court could not find that a violation had 
actually occurred. Defendant's argument on appeal is that because the one year 
repayment requirement was not put into the district court's written sentence, the court's 
subsequent conclusion that she violated her probation by failing to satisfy her restitution 
obligation within one year was therefore an abuse of the court's discretion. Aplt. Br. 16-
17. The district court, however, did not base its ruling on the one year requirement. The 
court's January 9, 2006, ruling was instead explicitly based on the court's determination 
that defendant had not yet paid the entire restitution amount of $300,000. R. 138-40. 
Indeed, the district court specifically stated that it considered the rate-of-payment 
question to be of little consequence. While acknowledging that "there has been some 
confusion as to the rate at which the restitution was to be paid," R. 139, the court stated 
that "there has never been any confusion in the sentence imposed by the Court nor in the 
• 9 
documents of Adult Probation and Parole, that the restitution amount was $300,000." R. 
139. "In light of the extensive amount of restitution yet to be paid," the court extended 
defendant's formal probation "for the purposes of collecting restitution." R. 140. 
Defendant's arguments relating to the one year repayment requirement therefore address 
a ruling not issued and a rationale not advanced.5 
Defendant does not dispute that she has not paid full restitution. Indeed, she 
conceded below through counsel that she still owes more than $200,000. At the 
November 22, 2005 evidentiary hearing, her counsel informed the district court that 
"[njobody has said my client has paid $300,000, not even attempted to. We've done the 
math and we believe that that [sic] figures comes out to be about $95,000. I don't have 
the exact figure here in front of me so that's an approximate, but about $95,000 that she 
has paid." R. 176: 109. The district court had also heard testimony from one of 
defendant's probation officers that defendant still owed more than $280,000 in 
restitution, R. 176: 76, and had earlier received an AP&P report indicating that defendant 
owed $289,820.17 in restitution as of July 12, 2005. R. 90-93. Viewing this evidence in 
the light most favorable to the district court's findings, this evidence was sufficient to 
support the district court's conclusion that defendant has yet not paid $300,000. Under § 
77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) and under Jameson, this failure to fully pay restitution was sufficient 
justification for the court's decision to extend defendant's probation. 
5
 Defendant only argues that her failure to pay full restitution within one year was 
not a proper basis for extending probation. Aplt. Br. 15-20. Defendant has not argued, 
however, that either (1) her failure to pay $300,000 did not also violate the terms of her 
probation, or (2) that a failure to pay full restitution cannot generally be a basis for a 
probation extension decision. The State accordingly does not address these issues. 
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Even if the trial court's decision was predicated on the one year repayment 
requirement, defendant's assertion that this requirement was improperly imposed on her 
is incorrect. This Court's decision in Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996), relied on by defendant in her brief, Aplt. Br. 17-18, supports this 
conclusion. In Dorman-Ligh, a court commissioner issued a "strong preference" from the 
bench that a particular prosecutor be assigned to appear at all subsequent hearings on a 
particular case. 912 P.2d at 455. When a different prosecutor appeared on the matter, the 
commissioner issued an order finding the absent prosecutor in contempt and dismissing 
the State's case as a sanction. Id at 454. On appeal, this Court reversed, holding that the 
commissioner's oral pronouncements had not been sufficiently definite to have 
constituted a binding order. IdL at 455. While an "order need not be in writing, [ ] it must 
be objectively understandable as an order from which sanctions may accrue for 
disobedience." IdL 
At the original sentencing hearing in this case, the district court ordered defendant 
to "pay restitution of $300,000 within one year." R. 176: 7. Though the court allowed 
AP&P to set the "rate" of payment, R. 176: 8, the court qualified that decision by 
reiterating its "intent that it be paid as recommended by Adult Probation within one 
year." R. 176: 8. The court did not at any point grant AP&P control over the amount to 
be paid, nor did the court ever grant AP&P the authority to abrogate the one year 
requirement. R. 176: 6-10. While the court allowed AP&P to decide how much 
defendant would be obligated to pay on a month-to-month basis within that one year 
period, the court twice stated that the entire amount was to be paid within one year. 
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Thus, even if it were true that the probation extension decision was based on the one year 
requirement, the district court would still have been within its discretion in holding 
defendant to this condition. 
Like the defendant in State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, 124 P.3d 259, afFd., 
2006 UT 86, —P.3d —, the defendant in this case "did not have to accept the terms of 
[her] probation." Id at ^|19. Had she been dissatisfied with the district court's order that 
she pay a full $300,000 in restitution as a condition of her probation, she could have 
chosen to instead accept the prison term that had originally been imposed on her. "But 
Defendant did not choose incarceration. [S]he chose probation and thereby accepted its 
terms. Having accepted its terms, [s]he now must abide by them." Id. She has 
admittedly failed to do so, and the district court's decision to extend her probation should 
therefore be affirmed. 
II. DEFENDANT WAIVED HER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE BY 
VOLUNTARILY PLEADING GUILTY TO THE UNDERLYING 
CHARGES. 
Defendant next argues that her underlying convictions should be overturned on 
statute of limitations grounds. While acknowledging that she did not raise this issue 
below, defendant now asserts that the statute of limitations issue is "jurisdictional" and 
that the district court committed plain error by not correcting this mistake. Aplt. Br. 20-
23. There are three reasons why this argument should be rejected. 
First, defendant waived her right to challenge the charges by not filing a timely 
appeal. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that a party must file a 
notice of appeal within 30 days after the entry of judgment. This 30 day period begins 
12 
running in a criminal case at sentencing. State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 1005 ^ 4, 57 P.3d 
1065. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "it is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that 
failure to perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal." 
Id. at 95 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although defendant in this case 
was sentenced on September 30, 2002, she did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days 
of her sentencing. Her current attempt to raise issues relating to the original charges is 
therefore untimely and should be rejected. 
Second, the issue of whether a criminal statute of limitations is jurisdictional was 
squarely addressed by this Court in James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
cert denied 982 P.2d 88. In James, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 
manslaughter and one count of evidence tampering, but later filed a post-conviction 
petition arguing that the evidence tampering conviction had been barred under the statute 
of limitations. IdL at 568-69. On appeal, this Court ruled that the defendant had waived 
any potential statute of limitations defense by voluntarily pleading guilty. This Court 
first noted that "[t]he general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are 
legion, is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the 
essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, 
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." Id at 570-71 (quoting State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989)). This Court then held that "criminal statutes 
of limitations are not jurisdictional, but are a bar to prosecution which can be waived by a 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea." Id. at 573. Defendant's argument to the contrary in 
this case is therefore unfounded. 
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Third, defendant's assertion that a statute of limitations claim can be considered 
for the first time on appeal under the plain error doctrine is foreclosed by this Court's 
recent decision in State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, 126 P.3d 775. Like defendant 
here, McCloud raised a statute of limitations defense for the first time on appeal, arguing 
that appellate consideration was appropriate under the plain error doctrine. Id. at ^[5 n.l, 
12. This Court rejected that argument, instead holding that "[t]he statute of limitations is 
a defense that may be waived. Because the statute of limitations is a waivable defense, 
the district court did not commit plain error by not invoking the defense on behalf of 
McCloud." Id at 1112 (citing James, 965 P.2d at 572-73). 
Defendant in this case failed to raise a statute of limitations argument in either the 
original plea hearing, the subsequent sentencing hearing, or in any of the probation 
review hearings that led to the extension of her probation. By pleading guilty to the 
charged offenses, defendant voluntarily waived any applicable statute of limitations 
defense that she could have raised prior to the guilty plea. The district court therefore did 
not commit plain error by refusing to invoke the statute of limitations on her behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's decision to 
extend defendant's probation. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
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litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by 
oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
Respectfully submitted February 21, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RYAN D. TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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